What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for Puerto Rico by Pottow, John A. E.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2016
What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for
Puerto Rico
John A. E. Pottow
University of Michigan Law School, pottow@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1806
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pottow, John A. E. "What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for Puerto Rico." Rev. Jur. U. P. R. 85, no. 3 (2016): 689-704.
689	  
WHAT	  BANKRUPTCY	  LAW	  CAN	  AND	  CANNOT	  DO	  FOR	  PUERTO	  
RICO	  
CONFERENCE*	  
JOHN	  A.	  E.	  POTTOW**	  
	  
Introduction	  ............................................................................................................	  689	  
I.	   The	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  ......................................................................................	  690	  
A.	   The	  Constitution:	  Imposing	  Constraints	  on	  Bankruptcy	  Laws	  ..............	  690	  
B.	   Chapter	  7	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code:	  Liquidation	  and	  Discharge	  ..............	  693	  
C.	   Chapter	  11	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code:	  Consensual	  Reorganization	  
of	  Corporate	  Debts	  .....................................................................................	  694	  
D.	  Chapter	  9:	  Restructuring	  the	  Public	  Debts	  of	  the	  State	  
Subdivisions	  ................................................................................................	  696	  
II.	   Sovereign	  Debt	  Restructurings	  .......................................................................	  698	  
III.	   Puerto	  Rico’s	  debts	  ..........................................................................................	  699	  
IV.	   Lessons	  from	  Detroit’s	  debt	  restructuring	  ......................................................	  702	  
Conclusion	  ...............................................................................................................	  703	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  
AM	  GOING	  TO	   SPEAK	  AND	  THEN	   LEAVE	   SOME	  TIME	   FOR	   FURTHER	  DISCUSSION,	  
among	  other	  reasons	  because	  I	  will	  probably	  speak	  too	  quickly	  for	  you	  to	  
understand	  half	  of	  what	  I’m	  saying,	  and	  because	  I	  may	  get	  a	  little	  bit	  too	  
excited	  getting	  into	  the	  weeds	  of	  bankruptcy	  law,	  which	  I’m	  sure	  will	  be	  almost	  
as	  exciting	  for	  you	  as	  hearing	  the	  former	  governor	  talk	  about	  the	  constitutional	  
status	  of	  Puerto	  Rico.	  And	  I	   see	   I	  have	  some	  colleagues	  here	  who	  can	  keep	  me	  
honest	  if	  I	  go	  astray.	  So,	  what	  I	  will	  do	  is	  give	  a	  general	  introduction	  of	  what	  the	  
	  
	   *	  	   Note	  to	  the	  reader:	  This	  article	  is	  based	  on	  a	  February	  2016	  keynote	  address	  given	  at	  the	  Uni-­‐
versity	  of	  Puerto	  Rico	  Law	  Review	  Symposium	  Public	  Debt	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Puerto	  Rico.	  Thus,	  much	  
of	  it	  remains	  written	  in	  the	  first	  person,	  and	  so	  the	  reader	  may	  imagine	  the	  joy	  of	  being	  in	  the	  audi-­‐
ence.	  Citations	   and	   footnotes	   have	   been	   inserted	   before	   publication	  ‒	   sidebars	   that	   no	   reasonable	  
person	  would	  ever	  have	  inflicted	  upon	  a	  live	  audience,	  even	  one	  interested	  in	  bankruptcy	  law.	  Rhe-­‐
torical	  accuracy	  thus	  yields	  to	  scholarly	  pedantics.	  JAEP.	  
	   **	  	   John	  A.	  E.	  Pottow	  is	   the	   John	  Philip	  Dawson	  Collegiate	  Professor	  of	  Law	  at	   the	  University	  of	  
Michigan	  Law	  School.	  He	  thanks	  Karl	  Nagy	  for	  exceptional	  research	  assistance	  in	  the	  preparation	  of	  
this	  analysis,	  all	  the	  gracious	  hosts	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Puerto	  Rico,	  and	  also	  Virginia	  Neisler	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Michigan	  for	  additional	  research	  aid.	  
I	  
690	   REVISTA	  JURÍDICA	  UPR	   Vol.	  85	  
Bankruptcy	   Code	   does,	   how	   it	   works,	   and	   how	   it	   might	   have	   applicability	   to	  
what	  we	  will	   refer	   to	   as	   “The	  Troubles”	   for	  Puerto	  Rico,	   financially,	   right	  now.	  
We	  will	  also	  talk	  about	  some	  of	  the	  proposals	  that	  are	  being	  developed	  includ-­‐
ing,	  if	  the	  audience	  is	  interested,	  about	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  litigation	  that	  is	  un-­‐
folding	  regarding	  the	  bankruptcy	  proposal	  that	  Puerto	  Rico	  has	  put	  forward.	  To	  
that	  end,	  we	  will	  talk	  about	  bankruptcy	  law	  and	  its	  constraints,	  including	  Chap-­‐
ters	  7,	  11,	  and	  9	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	  Then	  we	  will	  look	  at	  sovereign	  debt	  
restructuring,	  and	  finally	  we	  will	  turn	  to	  Puerto	  Rico	  and	  Detroit.	  
I . 	   THE 	  BANKRUPTCY 	  CODE	  
First	  thing,	  what	  is	  bankruptcy?	  Bankruptcy	  is	  an	  area	  of	  law	  that	  allows	  the	  
adjustment	  of	  contractual	  and	  other	  private	  law	  relations.	  Mainly,	  it’s	  a	  discharge	  
of	  debt.	  Under	  our	  federal	  Constitution	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Congress	  has	  a	  
power	  to	  legislate	  a	  uniform	  bankruptcy	  law	  under	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Clause,1	  and	  
that	  means	  the	  power	  to	  enact	  legislation	  that	  confers	  discharge	  of	  private	  debt	  
obligations.	  Colloquially,	  I	  will	  say	  it	  allows	  the	  ripping	  up	  of	  contracts	  and	  that,	  
of	  course,	  is	  disappointing	  if	  you	  are	  the	  counterparty	  of	  that	  contract,	  but	  that	  is	  
what	  the	  premise	  of	  bankruptcy	  law	  is.	  
A.	   The	  Constitution:	  Imposing	  Constraints	  on	  Bankruptcy	  Laws	  
We	  have	  a	  few	  constraints	  on	  the	  use	  of	  bankruptcy	  law	  powers,	  and	  bank-­‐
ruptcy	  power	  is	  not	  necessarily	  exclusive	  to	  the	  Federal	  Government.	  Indeed,	  in	  
the	  early	  days,	   the	   states	  were	  heavily	   involved.	  We	  did	  not	  have	  a	  permanent	  
bankruptcy	  law	  in	  the	  United	  States	  until	  the	  1898	  Bankruptcy	  Act.2	  Before	  that,	  
in	  the	  19th	  century,	  there	  was	  a	  succession	  of	  stop-­‐gap	  bankruptcy	  bills	  that	  the	  
Federal	  Congress	  would	  pass	  and	  then	  sunset	  out	  of	  existence.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  
correspond	   those	   to	   financial	   crises,	   so	   when	   there	   was	   a	   financial	   crisis	   and	  
there	  was	  a	  bunch	  of	  debt,	  Congress	  would	  pass	  a	  bankruptcy	  law	  to	  address	  the	  
crisis,	   but	   then	   the	   law	   went	   away	   when	   normalcy	   returned.	   So	   some	   states	  
picked	  up	  the	  slack.	  Even	  though	  lacking	  a	  Bankruptcy	  Clause,	  they	  too	  passed	  
debt	  relief	  laws	  under	  their	  general	  police	  powers.	  Thus,	  the	  states	  had	  residual	  
power	  to	  enact	  their	  own	  bankruptcy	  legislations,	  and	  many	  states	  did;	  all	  sorts	  
of	  states	  had	  all	  sorts	  of	  bankruptcy	  laws.3	  A	  couple	  hundred	  years	  ago,	  however,	  
this	  need	  for	  the	  states	  to	  play	  back-­‐up	  functionally	  fell	  out	  of	  existence	  once	  the	  
permanent	  federal	  legislation	  of	  the	  1898	  Bankruptcy	  Act	  came	  into	  play.	  
Importantly,	  the	  states	  did	  not	  have	  as	  much	  bankruptcy	  power	  as	  the	  Fed-­‐
eral	  Government.	  There	  were	  specific	  constraints	  on	  the	  use	  by	  the	  states	  of	  their	  
powers	  to	  pass	  bankruptcy	  laws	  under	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  principal	  historical	  
	  
	   1	   U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  8,	  cl.	  4.	  
	   2	   Bankruptcy	  Act	  of	  1898,	  ch.	  541,	  30	  Stat.	  544.	  
	   3	   See,	  e.g.,	  Act	  of	  March	  21,	  1788,	  ch.	  92,	  1788	  N.Y.	  Laws	  823.	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constraint	   on	   state	   bankruptcy	   laws	  was	   the	  Contracts	  Clause	   of	   the	  Constitu-­‐
tion,	  which	  applies	  against	  the	  states.4	  The	  Contracts	  Clause	  of	  the	  Constitution	  
proscribes	   governmental	   impairment	   of	   contracts.	   Remember	   I	   said	   that	   the	  
whole	  purpose	  of	  bankruptcy	  law	  is	  to	  rip	  up	  contracts.	  If	  you	  have	  a	  Contracts	  
Clause	   cabining	   the	   states	   that	   prohibits	   them	   from	   ripping	  up	   contracts,	   that	  
makes	   it	   an	   uphill	   battle	   for	   them	   to	   enact	   a	  meaningful	   bankruptcy	   law.	   The	  
federal	  Constitution	  confers	  on	  the	  Congress	  the	  power	  to	  pass	  uniform	  laws	  on	  
the	  subject	  of	  bankruptcy,	  which	  is	  unfettered	  by	  the	  Contracts	  Clause.	  So	  there	  
is	  residual	  space	  for	  states	  to	  pass	  bankruptcy	  laws	  as	  well	  as	  Congress,	  but	  not	  a	  
lot	  of	  space	  given	  the	  Contracts	  Clause	  (and	  absence	  of	  a	  Bankruptcy	  Clause).	  
How	  did	  the	  early	  constitutional	   jurisprudence	  on	  bankruptcy	  powers	  treat	  
these	   state	  bankruptcy	   laws,	   in	   light	   of	   these	   constraints	   imposed	  by	   the	  Con-­‐
tract	  Clause	  and	  in	  light	  of	  the	  inapplicability	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Clause?	  In	  order	  
to	  simplify	  it,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  approach	  to	  state	  bank-­‐
ruptcy	  laws	  was	  to	  say	  that	  a	  state	  could	  pass	  bankruptcy	  laws	  under	  its	  general	  
police	  powers,	  but	  these	  could	  only	  apply	  “prospectively,”	  to	  after-­‐enacted	  con-­‐
tracts.5	  This	  means	  that	  a	  state	  could	  pass	  a	  bankruptcy	  law,	  but	  it	  could	  not	  use	  
that	  law	  to	  abrogate	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  private	  contract.	  In	  other	  words,	  New	  Jersey	  
could	  pass	  a	  bankruptcy	  act	  in	  2015	  and	  say,	  “Any	  contracts	  entered	  into	  2015	  or	  
later	   are	   covered	   by	   this	   bankruptcy	   law	   of	  New	   Jersey.”	   Anything	   that	  would	  
have	   retroactive	   application	   to	   contracts,	   however,	   they	   worried	   would	   be	   an	  
impairment	  of	  the	  contract	  that	  was	  discharged	  in	  bankruptcy	  and	  so	  would	  run	  
afoul	  the	  Contracts	  Clause.	  That	  was	  the	  only	  meaningful	  constraint;	  you	  could	  
pass	   a	   bankruptcy	   law	   for	   your	   state	   as	   long	   as	   it	   only	   applied	   prospectively.	  
Now,	   I	   say	  only	   apply	  prospectively	  as	   if	   that	   is	  a	  mere	   tiny	  wrinkle,	  but	   if	  you	  
have	  a	  debt	  crisis,	  you	  probably	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  debt	  built	  up	  already,	  and	  so	  solely	  
prospective	  enactment	  is	  going	  to	  be	  cold	  comfort.	  Still,	  that	  was	  the	  lay	  of	  the	  
constitutional	  land.	  
The	   second	   restriction	   under	   the	   Constitution	   on	   bankruptcy	   powers,	   and	  
this	  applies	  to	  the	  Federal	  Government	  as	  well,	  is	  the	  property	  rights	  protection	  
under	  the	  Takings	  Clause.6	  The	  constraints	  that	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  imposes	  on	  
the	  Federal	  Government	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  realm	  have	  not	  been	  definitively	  re-­‐
solved	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  However,	  we	  have	  some	  pretty	  juicy	  dictum,	  and	  
I’m	  going	   to	   tell	  you	  what	   it	   is.	  First	  of	  all,	   let	  me	  explain	  what	   the	  conceptual	  
issue	  is.	  I	  say	  bankruptcy	  law	  allows	  you	  to	  “rip	  up”	  contracts.	  I	  am	  being	  some-­‐
what	   glib	   in	  my	   exposition;	   it	   technically	   allows	   you	   to	   “reject”	   contracts,	   and	  
then	  the	  aggrieved	  counterparty	  gets	  to	  file	  a	  claim	  in	  your	  bankruptcy	  estate	  as	  
a	  creditor.7	  If	  your	  bankruptcy	  estate	  pays	  five	  cents	  on	  the	  dollar,	  the	  counter-­‐
party	  gets	  five	  cents	  on	  the	  dollar	  for	  the	  breach	  damages.	  On	  the	  whole,	  I	  think	  
	  
	   4	   U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  8,	  cl.	  4.	  
	   5	   Sturges	  v.	  Crowninshield,	  17	  U.S.	  122	  (1819).	  
	   6	   U.S.	  CONST.	  amends.	  V,	  XIV.	  
	   7	   11	  U.S.C.	  §	  365	  (2014).	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for	  simplicity,	   it’s	   fair	  to	  call	   it	  ripping	  up	  a	  contract.	  But	  can	  bankruptcy	  allow	  
“ripping	  up”	  property	  rights?	  
Well,	   sort	   of,	   yes.	   The	   Bankruptcy	   Code	   even	   allows	   for	   the	   variation	   of	  
property	  rights,	  which	  gets	  into	  more	  sensitive	  constitutional	  territory	  given	  the	  
Takings	  Clause.	  For	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  Bankruptcy	  Code,	  under	  Section	  
522(f),	   actually	   takes	   certain	   liens	   -­‐bona	   fide	   property	   interests-­‐	   that	   the	   Con-­‐
gress	   finds	  offensive	  as	  a	  policy	  matter	  and	   just	   erases	   them.8	   It	   says,	   in	  effect,	  
you	  may	  very	  well	  have	  a	  lien	  on	  that	  household	  couch	  under	  state	  law,	  but	  we	  
think	  it’s	  predatory	  for	  you	  to	  take	  liens	  on	  household	  furniture	  when	  it’s	  exempt	  
from	  involuntary	  seizure.	  So	   if	  you	  have	  a	  non-­‐purchase-­‐money	   lien	  on	  certain	  
types	  of	  exempt	  property,	   it	   just	  goes	  away	  by	  order	  of	   federal	  bankruptcy	   law.	  
Making	  the	  lien	  go	  away	  -­‐at	  least	  from	  the	  lienholder’s	  perspective-­‐	  is	  literally	  a	  
taking	  of	  property.	  
There	  were	  no	  such	  aggressive	  lien-­‐invalidation	  provisions	  in	  the	  1898	  Bank-­‐
ruptcy	   Act.	   Perhaps	   unsurprisingly,	   when	   these	   provisions	   were	   added	   to	   the	  
1978	  Bankruptcy	  Code	   -­‐which	   is	  about	  eighty	  percent	  of	  what	  we	  are	  using	   to-­‐
day-­‐	  consumer	   lenders	  challenged	   them	  as	  unconstitutional,	  claiming	   that	   tak-­‐
ing	   away	   their	   liens	   amounted	   to	   an	   impermissible	   taking	  under	   the	  Constitu-­‐
tion.	  In	  1982,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decided	  United	  States	  v.	  Security	  Bank.9	  In	  this	  
case,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  did	  not	  decide	  whether	  Congress,	  exercising	  its	  powers	  
under	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Clause,	  could	  invalidate	  liens	  or	  whether	  the	  Bankruptcy	  
Clause	  had	  to	  be	  subordinate	   to	   the	  Takings	  Clause.	   (Consider	   that	   there	   is	  no	  
intrinsic	   textual	   reason	  why	  one	  clause	   is	  better	   than	  another.	  You	  could	  go	   in	  
alphabetical	  order,	  you	  could	  have	  policy	  considerations	  and	  say	  “we	  think	  one	  
clause	  captures	  more	  of	  our	  principles;	  we	  want	   to	  have	   that	   clause	   trump	   the	  
other.”)	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   ducked	   the	   issue,	   leaving	   the	   interaction	   of	   the	  
Bankruptcy	  Clause	  and	  the	  Takings	  Clause	  unclear.	  
What	  did	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  say?	  Essentially,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  said	  that	  
removing	  pre-­‐existing	   liens	   sounds	   like	  a	   taking	  of	  property,	   and	   that	   it	  would	  
expect	  an	  awfully	  clear	  statement	  from	  Congress	   if	   that’s	  what	   it	  wanted	  to	  do.	  
Hence,	   since	   the	   1978	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  did	  not	  have	  any	  applicable	  provisions	  
regarding	  timing,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decided	  to	  interpret	  the	  statute	  as	  meaning	  
that	  only	  liens	  that	  were	  created	  after	  1978,	  prospectively,	  could	  be	  invalidated,	  
but	  not	  pre-­‐existing	  ones.	  In	  sum,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  never	  decided	  whether	  
Congress	   can	   invalidate	   property	   rights	  with	   its	   bankruptcy	   powers,	   but	   it	   has	  
offered	  some	  pretty	   juicy	  dicta	   suggesting	   that	   it	   could	  create	   serious	  constitu-­‐
tional	  problems	  to	  do	  so,	  even	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  bankruptcy	  authority.	  
That	  is	  a	  contested	  position,	  by	  the	  way.	  Academics,	  because	  this	  is	  what	  we	  
do	  for	  a	  living,	  fight	  over	  whether	  that	  is	  right	  or	  wrong.	  We	  go	  through	  the	  his-­‐
tory	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Clause,	  we	  go	  through	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Takings	  Clause,	  
we	  go	   through	   the	  history	  of	   any	  other	   clause	   for	  good	  measure.	  Nevertheless,	  
	  
	   8	   Id.	  §	  522(f).	  
	   9	   See	  United	  States	  v.	  Sec.	  Indus.	  Bank,	  459	  U.S.	  70	  (1982).	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there	  is	  some	  suggestion	  from	  academics	  who	  have	  done	  some	  serious	  historical	  
work,	   and	   Professor	   Charles	   J.	   Tabb	   is	   one	   of	   them,	   that	   it	   is	   not	   at	   all	   clear	  
whether	   the	   Takings	   Clause	   constrains	   the	   Bankruptcy	  Clause.10	   If	   the	   govern-­‐
ment	  is	  exercising	  good	  faith	  authority	  to	  pass	  a	  bankruptcy	  discharge	  law,	  then	  
there’s	   a	  decent	   argument	   that	   there	  may	  not	   even	  be	  a	   just	   compensation	   re-­‐
quirement	  for	  a	  taking	  (there	  might	  be	  a	  due	  process	  constraint,	  of	  course,	  but	  
that’s	  a	  separate	  question).	  
Those	   are	   basically	   the	   only	   constraints	   of	   importance.	   There	   are	   others,	  
such	  as	  Uniformity,11	  but	  they	  are	  too	  technical	   for	  us	  to	  worry	  about	  today.	  As	  
you	  can	  see,	  while	  there	  are	  some	  constraints,	  they	  are	  not	  very	  strong.	  The	  Fed-­‐
eral	  Congress	  can	  do	  a	  lot	  with	  those	  Bankruptcy	  Clause	  powers,	  -­‐indeed	  it	  has-­‐	  
and	  even	   the	   states	  can	   take	   some	   lesser	  measures	   if	   they	  want,	  which	   is	  what	  
Puerto	  Rico	  tried	  to	  do	  last	  year,	  taking	  a	  page	  from	  history.	  
B.	   Chapter	  7	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code:	  Liquidation	  and	  Discharge	  
Now	  let	  us	  talk	  about	  bankruptcy	  law	  under	  the	  1978	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	  The	  
primordial	  chapter	  of	  bankruptcy	  law	  is	  Chapter	  7.12	  Chapter	  7	  provides	  the	  tradi-­‐
tional	   liquidation	  and	  discharge	  of	  debt.	  There	  are	   two	   fundamental	  principles	  
upon	  which	   a	   bankruptcy	   law	   like	   this	   is	   passed,	   a	   law	  which	   is	   replicated	   in	  
many	  systems	  around	  the	  world.	  One	  is	  that	  when	  a	  debtor	  is	  bankrupt,	  all	  the	  
creditors	  are	  corralled	   into	  accepting	  equal	  treatment.	  All	   the	  creditors	  have	  to	  
share	   equally,	   which	   is	   the	   principle	   of	   pari	   passu	   distribution.	   Now,	   I	   should	  
drop	  a	  big	  footnote	  here	  and	  say,	  like	  in	  Animal	  Farm,	  some	  creditors	  are	  more	  
equal	  than	  others.13	  But	  the	  aspiration	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  system	  is	  for	  equal	  shar-­‐
ing	  of	   the	  pain	  and	  obligations	  when	  there	   is	   insufficient	  money	   to	  go	  around.	  
This	  is	   important	  because	  bankruptcy	  has	  a	  very	  powerful	  collectivization	  force	  
to	  it.	  
Most	  principally,	  there	  is	  something	  called	  the	  automatic	  stay	  of	  bankrupt-­‐
cy.14	  What	   the	  automatic	   stay	  does	   is	   invalidate	  and	   freeze	  any	  attempt	  by	  any	  
creditor	  anywhere	  to	  collect	  money	  from	  the	  debtor	  on	  his	  or	  her	  own	  account.	  
As	  you	  can	  imagine,	  if	  you	  are	  a	  particularly	  aggressive	  creditor,	  and	  you	  are	  first	  
off	  the	  mark	  and	  think	  you	  can	  shake	  the	  debtor	  down	  really	  well,	  you	  become	  
disappointed	  when	  a	  bankruptcy	  court	  says	  you	  have	  to	  stop	  ‒	  and	  not	  only	  do	  
you	  have	  to	  stop,	  you	  have	  to	  stop	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  him	  over	  there,	  the	  lazy	  fel-­‐
low	  creditor	  who	  has	  not	  done	  anything	  yet	  because	  you	  are	  all	  going	   to	  share	  
together.	  Aggressive	   creditors	   thus	  dislike	  bankruptcy,	   although	   that	  may	  be	   a	  
	  
	   10	   Charles	  J.	  Tabb,	  The	  Bankruptcy	  Clause,	  the	  Fifth	  Amendment,	  and	  the	  Limited	  Rights	  of	  Secured	  
Creditors	  in	  Bankruptcy,	  2015	  U.	  ILL.	  L.	  REV.	  765	  (2015).	  
	   11	   U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  8,	  cl.	  1.	  
	   12	   11	  U.S.C.	  §§	  701-­‐784.	  
	   13	   GEORGE	  ORWELL,	  ANIMAL	  FARM	  (1946).	  Cf.	  11	  U.S.C.	  §	  507	  (ranking	  priority	  of	  certain	  creditors).	  
	   14	   11	  U.S.C.	  §	  362.	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social	   welfare	   wash,	   because	   I	   suppose	   slow	   creditors	   like	   bankruptcy	   equally	  
and	  oppositely.	  We	  can	  debate	  that	  if	  inclined.	  
The	  second	  thing	  bankruptcy	  does	  in	  Chapter	  7	  liquidation	  is	  allow	  for	  a	  dis-­‐
charge	  of	   indebtedness.15	  This	  discharge	  of	   indebtedness	   is	   the	  canonical	   “fresh	  
start”	  of	  bankruptcy.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  you	  have	  a	  moment	  of	  clarity,	  a	  moment	  of	  
realization	   of	   financial	   insolvency.	   You	   get	   all	   the	   creditors	   in	   the	   room,	   the	  
debtor	  gives	  all	  of	   its	  non-­‐exempt	  assets	  up,16	  and	  the	  creditors	  take	  everything	  
else	  to	  share	  pro	  rata	  as	  they	  discharge	  the	  debtor	  and	  book	  a	  loss.	  People	  then	  
move	  on.	  That	  is	  Chapter	  7	  bankruptcy.	  
Importantly,	   there	   is	   no	   discharge	   for	   businesses.17	   Humans	   need	   a	   fresh	  
start.	  Corporations	  do	  not.	  Bankruptcy’s	  discharge	  is	  about	  individuals;	  individu-­‐
als	  need	  fresh	  starts.	  Business	  entities	  can	  just	  fail	  and	  expire.	  
C.	   Chapter	  11	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code:	  Consensual	  Reorganization	  of	  Corpo-­‐
rate	  Debts	  
We	  also	  have	  something	  called	  Chapter	  11,	  which	  is	  where	  businesses	  come	  
in.18	   Chapter	   11	   has	  worked	   out	   pretty	  well	   for	   us.	   It	   is	   not	   flawless,	   but	   it	   has	  
worked	   out	   pretty	   well	   and	   has	   been	   replicated	   in	   other	   insolvency	   systems	  
around	  the	  world.	  
The	  premise	  of	  Chapter	  11	  is	  that	  some	  businesses	  might	  be	  worth	  saving	  and	  
may	  need	  some	  sort	  of	  fresh	  start.	  Similar	  to	  Chapter	  7,	  in	  Chapter	  11	  debtors	  still	  
have	  the	  automatic	  stay;	  creditors	  cannot	  collect	  anything	  on	  their	  own	  outside	  
the	   bankruptcy	   court	   proceedings.	   However,	   unlike	   Chapter	   7	   bankruptcy	   -­‐
where	  a	  debtor	  just	  comes	  in,	  files	  a	  petition,	  and	  gets	  her	  discharge-­‐	  Chapter	  11	  
is	   a	   consensual,	   vote-­‐driven	   regime	  where	   the	   creditors	   vote	   on	   a	   plan	  of	   how	  
(and	  whether)	  to	  restructure	  the	  debts	  of	  the	  debtor.	  And	  “restructure”	  the	  debts	  
in	  regular	  words	  means	  “cutting.”	  So	  the	  plan	  might	  be	  to	  cut	  twenty	  percent	  of	  
the	  principal	  of	  all	  the	  debt.	  In	  Chapter	  11,	  the	  creditors	  vote	  on	  that.	  Now,	  why	  
would	  a	  creditor	  vote	  to	  reduce	  the	  money	  that’s	  owed?	  Because	  the	  creditor	  will	  
look	  at	   the	  alternative,	  and	   the	  alternative	   is	  you	  cut	   the	  debtor	  up	  and	  divide	  
the	   assets	   that	   you	   can	   sell	   in	   an	   auction,	  which	   usually	   doesn’t	   fetch	   a	   lot	   of	  
money.	  If	  a	  debtor	  has	  going-­‐concern	  value,	  i.e.,	  if	  the	  whole	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  
sum	  of	   its	  parts,	   then	   finding	  some	  way	   to	  keep	   that	  debtor	  alive	  and	  whole	   is	  
valuable,	  even	  if	  it	  means	  conceding	  to	  a	  partial	  loss	  on	  your	  principal.	  
Different	  creditors	  have	  different	  conceptions	  of	  how	  to	  do	  that,	  of	  course,	  
and	  that	  is	  why	  they	  have	  elections	  and	  vote.	  It’s	  financial	  democracy.	  The	  idea	  is	  
that	  if	  the	  majority	  of	  creditors	  -­‐it	  is	  actually	  a	  supermajority	  of	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  vot-­‐
	  
	   15	   Id.	  §§	  523(a),	  727(a).	  
	   16	   Consumer	   creditors	  have	   certain	  exempt	  assets	  which	  are	  not	  part	  of	   the	  bankruptcy	   estate,	  
but	  everything	  that	  has	  got	  value	  and	  can	  be	  liquidated,	  goes	  to	  the	  creditors.	  11	  U.S.C.	  §522.	  
	   17	   11	  U.S.C.	  §	  727(a)(1).	  
	   18	   Id.	  §§	  1101-­‐1174.	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ing	  system	  in	  bankruptcy-­‐	  think	  it	  is	  a	  fair	  plan	  and	  good	  plan,	  then	  it	  votes	  for	  
this	   plan.19	   And	   the	   majority	   gets	   to	   bind	   dissident	   minorities.	   The	   most	   im-­‐
portant	   power	   of	   Chapter	   11	   of	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code	   is	   the	   power	   to	   bind	   the	  
hold-­‐out	  who	  does	  not	  want	  to	  cut	  his	  or	  her	  debt.	  When	  they	  are	  dragged	  into	  
Chapter	  11,	  creditors	  vote,	  and	  if	  a	  supermajority	  says	  that	  it	   is	  a	  good	  plan	  and	  
that	  creditors	  should	  restructure,	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  if	  you,	  yourself,	  do	  not	  vote	  
in	  favor.	  If	  you	  are	  out-­‐voted,	  you	  lose	  and	  you	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  plan.20	  
Why	  is	   that	  so	   important?	  Why	  is	   that	  the	  conceptual	   lynchpin	  of	  Chapter	  
11?	  It	  is	  so	  important	  because	  consider	  if	  I	  had	  all	  you	  guys	  in	  the	  room,	  and	  I	  had	  
a	  hundred	  people	  that	  I	  had	  to	  negotiate	  with,	  and	  I	  said:	  “I	  don’t	  think	  I	  can	  pay	  
all	   of	   you.”	   I	  would	   start	  with	   the	   friendliest-­‐looking	   person	   right	   in	   the	   front	  
and	  say:	  “Will	  you	  take	  a	  fifteen	  percent	  haircut?”	  And	  he	  says:	  “sure.”	  Then	  I	  go	  
to	  the	  next-­‐friendliest	  person	  and	  say:	  “So,	  you	  know,	  there	  is	  talk	  about	  a	  fifteen	  
percent	  haircut,	  are	  you	  on	  board?”	  And	  she	  says:	  “Sure.”	  I	  go	  all	  the	  way	  through	  
the	  room.	  Then	  I	  get	  to	  person	  Number	  Ninety-­‐nine,	  and	  I	  say;	  “Ninety-­‐nine,	  will	  
you	  take	  a	  fifteen	  percent	  haircut?”	  And	  Ninety-­‐nine	  says:	  “Well,	  is	  someone	  else	  
taking	  that?”	  And	  I	  say:	  “Yeah,	  everyone	  is,	  so	  are	  you	  going	  to	  go	  along?”	  Nine-­‐
ty-­‐nine	  thinks,	   stares	  back	  at	  me	   icily,	  and	  says:	   “No.”	  Flumoxed,	   I	  plead:	   “Will	  
you	  take	  a	  fourteen	  percent	  haircut,	  at	  least?”	  The	  recalcitrance	  continues:	  “No.”	  
“Will	  you	  take	  any	  haircut?”	  “No,	  get	  lost.”	  Now,	  I	  am	  stuck.	  But	  here	  is	  what	  is	  
worse.	  Number	  One,	  my	  erstwhile	  friend,	  gets	  wind	  of	  it,	  and	  says:	  “Wait	  a	  mi-­‐
nute,	  wait,	  Ninety-­‐nine’s	  taking	  no	  haircut	  and	  I’m	  a	  schmuck	  taking	  fifteen	  per-­‐
cent?	  That’s	  not	  fair!	   I	  change	  my	  mind;	  I	  am	  not	  taking	  a	  fifteen	  percent	  hair-­‐
cut.”	  And	  as	  soon	  as	  Number	  One	  bails,	  Number	  Two	  will	  back	  out,	  and	  so	  on	  as	  
the	  deal	  dies.	  
That	  is	  the	  collective	  action	  problem	  with	  holdouts.	  That	  is	  why	  bankruptcy	  
laws	   are	   necessary	   to	   bind	   creditors,	   because	   in	   bankruptcy	   I	   can	   now	   get	   to	  
Ninety-­‐nine	  and	  say:	  “I	  don’t	  care	  anymore	  about	  you.	  We	  are	  going	  to	  get	  a	  fif-­‐
teen	  percent	  haircut,	  and	  I	  have	  the	  votes	  to	  get	  that	  plan	  passed,	  so	  be	  as	  recal-­‐
citrant	   as	   you	   like!”	  There	   is	  no	   incentive	   to	  hold	  out.	  That	   is	  what	  Chapter	   11	  
bankruptcy	  does.	  
Although	   there	   are	   complex	   voting	   rules,	   classes,	   and	   all	   sorts	   of	   fun	   stuff	  
that	   are	   crammed	   down	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	   the	   general	   principle	   is	  
that	  it	  is	  a	  consensual	  voting	  system.21	  Cannot	  confirm	  a	  plan?	  Cannot	  come	  out	  
with	  a	  plan	  that	  your	  creditors	  like?	  You	  do	  not	  get	  to	  reorganize.	  You	  are	  done:	  
you	   liquidate.22	   Off	   to	   Chapter	   7	   with	   you.	   That’s	   Chapter	   11	   of	   the	   American	  
bankruptcy	   system	   and,	   as	   I	   said,	   it	   has	   attracted	   some	   attention	   around	   the	  
world.	  Many	   companies	   have	   reorganized	   through	   the	  Chapter	   11	   process,	   and	  
I’m	  relatively	  confident	  I	  flew	  on	  one	  of	  them	  on	  my	  way	  down	  to	  San	  Juan.	  
	  
	   19	   Id.	  	  §§	  1126(c),	  1129(a)(8).	  
	  20	   Id.	  §	  1141	  (a).	  
	   21	   See,	  e.g.,	  id.	  	  §	  1129(b)	  
	  22	   Id.	  §	  1112(b)(2)(A).	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D.	   Chapter	  9:	  Restructuring	  the	  Public	  Debts	  of	  the	  State	  Subdivisions	  
What	  is	  Chapter	  9?	  This	  exotic	  little	  beast	  occupies	  four	  poorly	  visited	  pages	  
of	  the	  United	  States	  Code.23	  Chapter	  9	  is	  a	  “Chapter-­‐11-­‐voting-­‐kind-­‐of-­‐system”	  for	  
public	   entities	   that	   go	   bankrupt,	   like	   cities	   or	   subdivisions	   of	   a	   state.	   Not	   the	  
state	  itself	  -­‐the	  state,	  under	  our	  dual	  sovereignty	  system,	  is	  sovereign	  and	  cannot	  
be	  put	   into	  a	   federal	  bankruptcy	  proceeding.	  More	  precisely,	  Congress	  has	  not	  
passed	   legislation	   to	   that	  effect.	   I	  do	  not	   think	   there	   is	  any	  constitutional	  con-­‐
straint	  on	  allowing	  a	  state	  to	  go	  through	  a	  bankruptcy	  system	  if	  it	  wants	  to,	  but	  
it	  cannot	  be	  forced.	  
The	  first	  section	  of	  Chapter	  9,	  Section	  901	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code,	  just	  cop-­‐
ies	   out	   about	   three	   quarters	   of	   Chapter	   11	   and	   announces	   that	   all	   those	   provi-­‐
sions	   apply	   in	   Chapter	   9,	   such	   as	   dividing	   creditors	   into	   classes,	   having	   them	  
vote	  on	  a	  plan,	  and	  so	  on.24	  There	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  special	  rules	  in	  Chapter	  9,	  how-­‐
ever,	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  its	  public	  origins	  and	  to	  constitutional	  concerns.	  I	  feel	  
the	  need	  for	  a	  little	  constitutional	  digression	  again,	  for	  which	  I	  apologize.	  When	  
the	   first	   version	  of	  Chapter	  9	  was	  passed,	  during	   the	  Depression,	   the	   Supreme	  
Court	  struck	  it	  down	  it	  as	  unconstitutional.25	  Why	  did	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  strike	  
down	  a	  part	  of	   the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  as	  unconstitutional?	   It	  had	  nothing	   to	  do	  
with	  the	  Contracts	  Clause	  and	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Takings	  Clause,	  which	  we	  
discussed	  earlier.	  The	  problem	  here	  was	  that	  Initial	  Chapter	  9	  was	  perceived	  to	  
infringe	   upon	   the	   Tenth	   and	   Eleventh	   Amendments.26	   The	   idea	   of	   allowing	   a	  
state’s	   entities,	   like	   its	   cities,	   to	  use	   the	   federal	  bankruptcy	  court	   system	  to	   re-­‐
structure	   its	  debts	  was	   seen	  as	   too	   invasive	  by	   the	  Federal	  Government	  on	   the	  
prerogatives	   of	   the	   sovereign	   states	   to	   manage	   their	   own	   affairs,	   namely,	   the	  
financial	  problems	  of	  their	  subdivisions.	  
After	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   struck	   down	   Initial	   Chapter	   9,	   Congress	   (back	  
when	  it	  was	  more	  functional)	  responded	  by	  amending	  the	  law	  to	  comport	  with	  
the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  holding.	  However,	  it	  did	  not	  radically	  rewrite	  Chapter	  9.	  It	  
merely	   injected	   a	   few,	   albeit	   significant,	   changes.	   Specifically,	   relevant	   for	   the	  
constitutional	   infirmities	   first	   identified	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   the	   Chapter	   9	  
bankruptcy	   rules	   were	   redesigned	   to	   include	   certain	   “eligibility	   screens”	   that	  
must	  be	  satisfied	  before	  a	  Chapter	  9	  bankruptcy	  proceeding	  can	  be	  opened.27	  A	  
Chapter	  9	  would-­‐be	  debtor	  has	  to	  have	  the	  consent	  of	  its	  state	  to	  file.	  This	  con-­‐
sent	  requirement	  vitiates	  the	  constitutional	  concerns	  about	  the	  Federal	  Govern-­‐
ment	  being	  too	  “pushy,”	  because	  if	  a	  state	  thinks	  the	  Feds	  are	  getting	  to	  be	  too	  
	  
	   23	   Id.	  §§	  901-­‐946.	  
	  24	   Id.	  §	  901.	  
	  25	   U.S.	  CONST.	  amends.	  X,	  XI.	  
	  26	   Ashton	  v.	  Cameron	  Cty.	  Water	  Imp.	  Dist.	  No.	  1,	  298	  U.S.	  513,	  532	  (1936).	  
	  27	   Municipal	   Bankruptcy	  Act	   of	   1937,	   Pub.	   L.	  No.	   75-­‐302,	   50	   Stat.	   653	   (1937)	   (adopting	  modern	  
Chapter	  9).	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pushy,	  the	  state	  can	  just	  say	  no.28	  Some	  states,	  for	  example,	  Georgia,	  do	  not	  allow	  
its	  entities	  to	  file	  Chapter	  9;	  Atlanta	  cannot	  file	  a	  Chapter	  9	  proceeding.29	  Many	  
states,	   like	  Michigan,	  have	  conditional	  requirements.	  For	  example,	  they	  require	  
that	   the	  entity	  go	  through	  an	  emergency	  procedure	  with	  a	   financial	  manager.30	  
The	   financial	  manager	   has	   to	   find	   that	   the	   entity’s	   prospects	   are	   hopeless	   and	  
then	  make	   a	   recommendation	  of	   filing	   for	  Chapter	   9	   relief.	   The	  Governor	   also	  
has	  to	  sign	  off	  on	  the	  filing.31	  
Those	  are	  the	  eligibility	  requirements	  of	  Chapter	  9.	  I	  will	  make	  a	  prediction	  
for	  you	  right	  now,	  which	  is	  a	  prediction	  of	  general	  litigation	  and	  dilatory	  tactics.	  
Remember	  I	  noted	  the	  idea	  that	  fast,	  aggressive	  creditors	  do	  not	  like	  bankrupt-­‐
cy?	   If	  Chapter	  9	   is	  ever	  extended	  to	  Puerto	  Rico	  or	   its	  sub-­‐entities,	   I	  guarantee	  
you	  that	  the	  parties	  that	  seem	  to	  have	  an	  appetite	  for	  litigation	  will	  be	  in	  there	  
robustly	  contending	  that	  there	  is	  no	  eligibility	  for	  filing	  for	  Chapter	  9	  even	  if	  it	  is	  
made	  available.	  They	  will	  protest	  and	  say	  that	   it	  has	  not	  been	  properly	  author-­‐
ized,	  or	  that	  there	  have	  not	  been	  good-­‐faith	  negotiations.32	  Perhaps	  even	  -­‐which	  
would	  be	   jaw-­‐dropping,	  but	   it	  was	  claimed	   in	  Detroit-­‐	   they	  may	  claim	  that	   the	  
debtor	  is	  not	  insolvent.	  Those	  are	  all	  requirements	  to	  file	  a	  Chapter	  9	  bankruptcy	  
proceeding.33	  
What	  are	  other	  unique	  rules	  in	  Chapter	  9?	  There	  is	  an	  express	  proscription	  
on	  federal	  bankruptcy	  judges	  getting	  involved	  in	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  the	  debt-­‐
or.34	  For	  example,	  let	  us	  presume	  that	  a	  bankruptcy	  judge	  finds	  that	  elections	  are	  
too	  expensive	  for	  an	  over-­‐indebted	  city	  and	  that	  they	  should	  be	  cancelled.	  That	  
is	  not	  allowed	  under	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  in	  Section	  903.	  Also,	  of	  particular	  im-­‐
portance	   to	   this	   crowd,	   Section	   903	   includes	   an	   explicit	   preemption	   provision	  
that	  precludes	  states	  from	  passing	  their	  own	  versions	  of	  Chapter	  9.35	  
I	   can	   give	   you	   historical	   background	   of	   where	   that	   pre-­‐emptive	   provision	  
came	  from.	  Remember	  I	  noted	  that,	  historically,	  there	  were	  temporary	  laws	  that	  
sunset	   out	   of	   existence	   to	   respond	   to	   discrete	   perceived	   problems	   and	   crises?	  
Scholars	  who	  have	  done	  good	  historical	  digging,	   like	  Professor	  Stephen	   J.	  Lub-­‐
ben,	  have	  found	  that	  when	  Chapter	  9	  was	  first	  enacted,	  it	  was	  one	  of	  those	  crisis	  
laws.	  It	  was	  supposed	  to	  exist	  for	  a	  small	  period	  of	  time	  and	  then	  go	  away.	  The	  
preemption	   provision	   was	   passed	   in	   that	   context.36	   In	   other	   words,	   while	   this	  
	  
	  28	   United	   States	   v.	   Bekins,	   304	  U.S.	   27,	   54	   (1938)	   (holding	   the	   consent	   requirement	   solved	   the	  
constitutional	  concerns).	  
	  29	   GA	  CODE	  ANN.	  §	  36-­‐80-­‐5	  (West	  2016).	  
	  30	   MICH	  COMP.	  LAWS	  ANN.	  §141.1541	  (West	  Supp.	  2014).	  
	   31	   Id.	  
	   32	   11	  U.S.C.	  §	  109(c)(5)(B)	  (2014).	  
	   33	   Id.	  §	  109(c).	  See	  In	  re	  City	  of	  Detroit,	  Michigan,	  504	  B.R.	  97	  (Bankr.	  E.D.	  Mich.	  2013).	  (finding	  
Detroit	  eligible	  to	  file	  Chapter	  9	  after	  lengthy	  eligibility	  litigation).	  
	  34	   11	  U.S.C.	  §	  904(1).	  
	   35	   Id.	  §	  903(1).	  
	  36	   See	  Stephen	  J.	  Lubben,	  Puerto	  Rico	  and	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Clause,	  88	  AM.	  BANKR.	  L.J.	  553	  (2014).	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short-­‐term	  law	  was	  in	  place,	  Congress	  did	  not	  want	  the	  states	  passing	  their	  own	  
competing	  laws.	  I	  suppose	  the	  good	  news	  is	  that,	  if	  you	  take	  the	  petitioner’s	  posi-­‐
tion	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  litigation	  currently	  unfolding,	  Puerto	  Rico	  is	  excused	  
from	  that	  preemptive	  provision,	  because,	  of	  course,	  Chapter	  9	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  
Puerto	  Rico.37	  
Other	   than	   that,	   the	  provisions	  of	  Chapter	  9	   that	  are	   specific	   to	  Chapter	  9	  
and	  not	  Chapter	  11	  are	  quite	  technical.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  for	  the	  finan-­‐
cial	   straits	   of	   this	   jurisdiction	   is	   that	   there	   is	   a	   “super	   protection”	   for	   what	   I	  
would	   call	   “revenue	   bonds.”38	   Why?	   Under	   Chapter	   11,	   these	   liens	   would	   be	  
deemed	  invalid	  as	  impermissible	  encumbrances	  on	  prospective	  revenues	  streams	  
that	   would	   get	   in	   the	   way	   of	   the	   redevelopment	   of	   the	   debtor	   and	   be	   disal-­‐
lowed.39	  They	  are	  protected,	  however,	   in	  Chapter	  9.	  As	   for	  secured	  credit	  more	  
generally,	  the	  bankruptcy	  rules	  in	  Chapter	  11	  provide	  protection	  for	  the	  collateral	  
of	  secured	  lenders.40	  This	  means	  that	  if	  I	  lend	  you	  money,	  and	  I	  have	  a	  mortgage	  
on	  your	  house,	  when	  we	  go	  into	  bankruptcy	  courts	  my	  mortgage	  is	  protected	  up	  
to	   the	  value	  of	   the	  house.	   I	  don’t	  have	   to	   share	   it	  with	  other	   creditors.	  That	   is	  
how	  secured	  lenders	  get	  collateral;	  they	  take	  mortgages.	  
Municipalities	   generally	   do	  not	   pledge	   real	   estate	   collateral	   as	   a	  way	   to	   fi-­‐
nance	  debt.	  What	  municipalities	  like	  to	  do	  is	  pledge	  what	  are,	  basically,	  receiva-­‐
bles.	   Instead	  of	  offering	  real	  assets	  as	  collateral,	   they	  pledge	   future	  tax	  revenue	  
streams.	  Essentially,	  they	  offer	  “first	  dibs”	  on	  the	  revenues	  that	  come	  in.	  Under	  
bankruptcy	   law	   in	  Chapter	  9,	  whether	   these	  priorities	  are	  protected	  as	   secured	  
debt	  is	  contested.	  This	  uncertainty	  of	  course	  makes	  some	  creditors	  anxious,	  but	  
that’s	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  beast.	  
In	  sum,	  Chapter	  9	  is	  a	  consensual	  voting	  system	  modeled	  on	  Chapter	  11,	  with	  
a	   few	   special	   tweaks.	   Like	   Chapter	   11,	   it	   gets	   the	   creditors	   together	   and	   forces	  
them	  to	  vote	  on	  a	  restructuring	  plan.	  
I I . 	   SOVEREIGN	  DEBT 	  RESTRUCTURINGS	  
Now	  I	  want	  to	  talk	  briefly	  about	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  system,	  which	  is	  relevant	  
when	  independent	  countries	  go	  broke.	  Before	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  
(IMF),	  there	  was	  the	  Paris	  Club,	  which	  was	  a	  consortium	  of	  developed	  countries	  
who	  lent	  to	  developing	  countries.	  Nowadays,	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  market	  is	  much	  
more	   complex.	  We	   have	   publicly	   traded	   bonds,	   often	   scooped	   up	   by	   specialty	  
investors.	  Today,	  the	  IMF	  is	  also	  around	  and	  comes	  in	  as	  the	  lender	  of	  last	  resort.	  
The	  lender	  of	  last	  resort’s	  job	  is	  to	  provide	  financing	  to	  countries	  that	  have	  lost	  
their	  access	  to	  the	  debt	  markets.	  The	  traditional	  way	  developing	  countries	  deal	  
with	  deficits,	  as	  you	  guys	  may	  know	  very	  well	  here,	  is	  that	  when	  you	  have	  financ-­‐
	  
	   37	   11	  U.S.C.	  §	  101(52).	  
	  38	   Id.	  §§	  902-­‐903.	  
	  39	   Id.	  §552(a).	  
	  40	   Id.	  §	  506(a).	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ing	  problems	  with	  your	  deficit,	  instead	  of	  solving	  them,	  you	  go	  and	  borrow	  more	  
money	   to	  plug	  budget	  holes.	  You	   turn	   to	   the	  bond	  markets.	  When	  you	  cannot	  
access	   those	  markets	  anymore	  because	  they’ve	   finally	  had	  enough,	  you	  need	  to	  
find	   a	  way	   to	   get	  money,	   because	   someone	   has	   to	   pay	   for	   the	   essential	   public	  
services	  to	  be	  provided.	  This	  is	  when	  the	  IMF	  intervenes	  with	  developing	  coun-­‐
tries.	  The	  quid	  pro	  quo	  that	  the	  IMF	  gives	  them	  is	  something	  called	  “conditionali-­‐
ty.”41	  When	  the	  IMF	  comes	  -­‐and	  this	  is	  why	  it	  is	  often	  hated-­‐	  it	  offers	  to	  give	  you	  
some	  money,	  but	  you	  have	  to	  show	  that	  you	  are	  making	  structural	  governance	  
reforms	  to	  have	  a	  path	  to	  fiscal	  reform.	  The	  IMF	  establishes	  certain	  criteria	  that	  
have	  to	  be	  met	  before	  releasing	  the	  next	  extension	  of	  cash.	  
Conditionality	   is	   a	   repeated	  pattern	   that	   is	  deployed	   throughout	   the	  world	  
and	   is	   happening	  with	  Greece	   as	  well.	   Thus,	  when	   the	   IMF	   does	   come	   in	   and	  
provide	   financing	   to	   broke	   countries	   that	   have	   huge	   debt	   overhang,	   there	   is	   a	  
great	   sacrifice	  of	   autonomy	  and	   sovereignty,	  which,	   as	   you	  might	   imagine,	   is	   a	  
very	  sensitive	  political	   issue.	  But	  this	  means	  that	  the	  IMF	  is	  good	  at	  measuring	  
financial	  sustainability	  to	  decide	  when	  that	  overhang	  requires	  the	  IMF	  to	  help.	  It	  
has	   rules	   of	   thumb,	   like:	   the	   ratio	   of	   the	   interest	   you	   are	   paying	   on	   your	   debt	  
compared	   to	   your	   nominal	   Gross	   Domestic	   Product	   (GDP),	   proportionally,	  
should	  not	  exceed	  a	  certain	  level.	  The	  IMF	  performs	  an	  analysis	  where	  it	  calcu-­‐
lates	  the	  amount	  of	  debt	  that	  you	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  pay	  off,	  even	  after	  assum-­‐
ing	   that	   you	   fix	   your	   governance	   problems	   and	   are	   running	   a	   primary	   surplus	  
and	  have	  balanced	  your	  budget.	  This	  is	  what	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  unsustainable	  
debt.	  You	  have	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  it.	  Thus,	  the	  IMF	  restructures	  this	  overhanging	  debt.	  
There	  is	  no	  bankruptcy	  court,	  so	  it	  cannot	  order	  the	  restructuring	  to	  take	  place,	  
and	  there	  is	  no	  voting	  system,	  but	  the	  IMF	  can	  basically	  cajole	  the	  lenders	  into	  
taking	   concessions	  because	   the	  debt	   is	  unsustainable	   and	  will	  never	  be	   repaid.	  
That	   is	   how	   sovereign	   debt	   is	   often	   restructured	   for	   deeply	   insolvent	   nation-­‐
debtors.	  
I I I . 	  PUERTO	  RICO’S 	  DEBTS	  
As	  mentioned,	   the	   IMF	   is	   pretty	   good	   at	  measuring	   unsustainability.	  Why	  
does	   that	  matter?	   It	  matters	   because	   on	  many	  measures	   by	   the	   IMF’s	   criteria,	  
Puerto	  Rico	  has	  unsustainable	  debt	  and	  is	  in	  the	  same	  league	  as	  many	  develop-­‐
ing	  countries.	   It	  has	  a	  debt	   that	  has	   tripled	   in	   the	  past	  decade-­‐plus	  and	  would	  
flunk	  most	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  criteria	  of	  sustainable	  debt.	  The	  Krueger	  report,	  written	  
by	  former	  IMF	  economist	  Anne	  O.	  Krueger,	  goes	  through	  all	  the	  relevant	  ratios	  
and	   provides	   a	   pretty	   good	   analysis	   of	   the	   unsustainability	   of	   Puerto	   Rico’s	  
debt.42	  
	  
	   41	   Factsheet,	   IMF	   Conditionality,	   INTERNATIONAL	   MONETARY	   FUND	   (March	   24,	   2016),	  
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm	  (last	  visited	  May	  13,	  2016).	  
	  42	   ANNE	   O.	   KRUEGER	   ET	   AL.,	   PUERTO	   RICO	   -­‐	   A	   WAY	   FORWARD	   (2015),	  
http://www.gdbpr.com/documents/PuertoRicoAWayForward.pdf.	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At	  seventy-­‐two	  billion	  dollars’	  worth	  of	  debt	  -­‐not	  even	  getting	  into	  the	  forty	  
billion	  dollars	  of	  unfunded	  pension	   liabilities-­‐	  you	  have	  a	  debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	   in	  
Puerto	  Rico	  that’s	  over	  a	  hundred	  percent.43	  That	  is	  not	  going	  to	  get	  paid	  off.	  You	  
can	  tighten	  all	   the	  belts	  you	  want	  -­‐you	  can	  tighten	  two	  belts	  and	  a	  pair	  of	  sus-­‐
penders-­‐	   but	   you	   are	  not	   going	   to	  pay	   that	   off.	   You	   are	   going	   to	  need	   to	  have	  
some	   debt	   relief	   of	   the	   same	   sort	   that	   the	   IMF	  would	   facilitate.	  However,	   the	  
IMF	  will	  not	  come	  in	  to	  a	  sub-­‐national	  political	  subdivision,	   like	  Puerto	  Rico.	   I	  
guess	  that’s	  too	  bad	  under	  the	  circumstances.	  Fortunately,	  we	  have	  the	  Chapter	  
9	  system,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  deal	  with	  such	  sub-­‐national	  public	   financial	  re-­‐
structurings	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Unfortunately,	  it	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  Puerto	  Ri-­‐
co,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  apply	  in	  two	  ways.	  
First,	  Chapter	  9	  does	  not	  apply	  legislatively.	  Political	  subdivisions	  of	  Puerto	  
Rico,	  such	  as	  the	  Puerto	  Rico	  Electric	  Power	  Authority	  (PREPA)	  and	  the	  city	  of	  
San	  Juan,	  cannot	  file	  for	  Chapter	  9.44	  That	  is	  a	  technical	  error	  in	  the	  Bankruptcy	  
Code.	  I	  testified	  a	  year	  ago	  urging	  Congress	  to	  fix	  it,	  but	  for	  mysterious	  reasons	  it	  
has	  not	  yet	  done	  so	  despite	   long-­‐pending	  legislation.45	  As	  expected,	  the	  aggres-­‐
sive	  investors	  who	  think	  that	  they	  would	  lose	  money	  if	  they	  have	  to	  participate	  
in	  a	  bankruptcy	  proceeding	  and	  share	  with	  others	  have	  been	  fighting	  the	  correc-­‐
tion.	  Now	  that	  they	  have	  found	  the	  loophole,	  the	  loophole	  is	  very	  important	  to	  
them.	   For	   demoralizing	   reasons,	   they	   have	   turned	   it	   into	   a	   political	   issue	   that	  
has	  divided	  the	  parties	  along	  straight	  partisan	  lines.	  I	  have	  no	  idea	  how,	  but	  now	  
it	  has	  become	  a	  democrat/republican	  issue.	  The	  democrats	  are	  in	  favor	  of	  fixing	  
the	  loophole	  and	  the	  republicans	  are	  against	  it.	  If	  you	  do	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  
Bankruptcy	  Code	  -­‐which	  I	  suspect	  is	  the	  case	  for	  ninety	  percent	  of	  Congress-­‐	  as	  
soon	  as	  you	  hear	  it	  is	  a	  political	  issue,	  and	  you	  have	  a	  primary	  campaign,	  you’ll	  
say,	  “Oh,	  I’m	  with	  the	  republicans,”	  or	  “I’m	  with	  the	  democrats,”	  depending	  on	  
your	   party.	   So	   I	   have	   a	   cynical	   prognosis	   on	   that	   being	   fixed	   anytime	   soon,	   at	  
least	  before	  primary	  season.	  
The	  second	  legislative	  barrier	  that	  Puerto	  Rico	  has	  for	  Chapter	  9	  is	  the	  terri-­‐
torial	  debt,	  which	  would	  be	  exempt	  even	   if	  Chapter	  9	  applied.	  There	   is	  a	   lot	  of	  
debt	  at	  the	  Commonwealth	  level.	  That	  debt	  cannot	  be	  filed	  under	  Chapter	  9	  for	  
the	  same	  reason	  that	  Illinois	  cannot	  file	  for	  Chapter	  9.	  Chapter	  9	  only	  applies	  to	  
subdivisions,	  not	  states.	  I	  believe	  the	  Commonwealth	  debt	  is	  also	  unsustainable	  
and	  needs	  to	  be	  restructured.	  You	  can	  try	  a	  contractual	  negotiation	  -­‐à	  la	  sover-­‐
eign	  debt	  per	  the	  IMF-­‐	  and	  maybe	  that	  would	  work.	  Indeed,	  the	  Governor	  here	  
has	   thrown	  down	  the	   first	   salvo	  with	  a	  proposed	   forty-­‐six	  percent	  haircut.46	  So	  
	  
	  43	   Id.	  
	  44	   11	  U.S.C.	  101	  (52).	  
	  45	   Puerto	  Rico	  Chapter	  9	  Uniformity	  Act	  of	  the	  2015:	  Hearing	  Before	  the	  Committee	  on	  the	  Judici-­‐
ary,	  Subcommittee	  Regulatory	  Reform,	  Commercial	  and	  Antitrust	  Law	  on	  H.R.	  870,	  114th	  Cong.	  1	  (2015)	  
(statement	  of	  Prof.	  Pottow,	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Law	  School).	  
	  46	   Puerto	   Rico	   Proposes	   46	   Percent	   Debt	   Cut	   in	   Creditor	   Plan,	   REUTERS	   (Feb.	   1,	   2016),	  
http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-­‐puertorico-­‐restructuring-­‐idUSN9N10U020	   (last	   visist	   May	   21,	  
2016).	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how	   about	   a	   forty-­‐six	   percent	   haircut?	   I	   think	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   characterize	   that	   as	  
having	  received	  a	  cool	  reception	  thus	  far.	  
There	  is,	  however,	  finally	  starting	  significant	  discussion	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  
solution	   to	   the	   debt	   problems	   here.	   Since	   there	   is	   already	   talk	   of	   extending	  
Chapter	  9	  to	  PREPA,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  it	  would	  be	  even	  more	  preferable	  
to	   have	   a	   full	   comprehensive	   restructuring	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   debt	   at	   the	  
same	  time,	  i.e.,	  extending	  Chapter	  9	  to	  apply	  to	  state-­‐level	  debt.	  On	  that	  subject,	  
I	  must	  add	  that	  Puerto	  Rico’s	  debt	  structure	  can	  hold	  its	  own	  against	  any	  multi-­‐
national	   corporation’s	   in	   terms	   of	   complexity.	   There	   are	   layers	   upon	   layers	   of	  
debt.	  For	  example,	  there	  are	  the	  general	  obligation	  bonds	  that	  have	  a	  2014	  con-­‐
stitutional	  amendment	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  prioritize	  them.47	  There	  is	  the	  Corpo-­‐
ración	   del	   Fondo	   de	   Interés	   Apremiante	   de	   Puerto	   Rico	   (COFINA)	   structure,48	  
which	  nominally	  segregates	  out	  sales-­‐tax	  revenue	  that	  may	  or	  not	  may	  be	  “claw-­‐
back-­‐able.”49	   Some	   of	   the	   highway	   bonds	   may	   be	   “clawback-­‐able”,	   others	   not.	  
Then	  there	  is	  the	  general	  unsecured	  debt.	  It	  gives	  me	  a	  headache,	  and	  I	  do	  this	  
for	  a	  living.	  The	  idea	  of	  trying	  to	  do	  ad	  hoc	  contractual	  negotiations,	  one	  by	  one,	  
with	  about	  a	  thousand	  guys	  in	  a	  room	  is	  daunting.	  That	  is	  why	  attention	  is	  now	  
turning	   to	  a	   comprehensive	   solution,	  perhaps	   this	   so-­‐called	   “Super	  Chapter	  9,”	  
that	  would	   allow	   the	  Commonwealth’s	   debt	   to	   be	   subject	   to	  Chapter	   9	   proce-­‐
dures	  as	  well.	  
“Super	  Chapter	  9”	  scares	  the	  pants	  off	  some	  people,	  who	  see	  it	  as	  the	  camel’s	  
nose	  under	  the	  tent	  to	  extending	  Chapter	  9	  to	  state	  debts.	  If	  you	  guys	  think	  you	  
have	  a	  problem	  in	  Puerto	  Rico,	  you	  should	  take	  a	  trip	  to	  Illinois.	  They	  have	  prob-­‐
lems,	   too,	   and	   Congress	   does	   not	   want	   to	   extend	   Chapter	   9	   to	   the	   states	   yet.	  
Fortunately,	   there	   is	  a	  way	  out	  of	   that:	  Congress	  can	  use	   the	  Territorial	  Clause	  
and	  say	  that	  it	  is	  just	  managing	  its	  territories.50	  After	  all,	  it	  has	  done	  it	  so	  well	  in	  
the	  past.	  So	  you	  could	  get	  some	  Chapter	  9-­‐like	  relief	  through	  that	  Clause,	  which	  
would	  be	  a	  good	  way	  to	  make	  it	  a	  one-­‐off	  and	  ensure	  that	  the	  floodgates	  would	  
stay	   closed	  without	  having	   to	  extend	   relief	   to	   the	   states	   (that	   is	  what	   I	  predict	  
will	  happen).	  Limiting	  a	  relief	  bill	  to	  territories	  thus	  gives	  some	  political	  cover	  to	  
legislators	  who	  are	  skeptical	  and	  anxious	  of	  extending	  Chapter	  9.	  
Make	   no	   mistake,	   something	   will	   eventually	   pass.	   It	   is	   inconceivable	   that	  
this	  debt	  will	  not	  be	   restructured	  and	  have	   substantial	   reductions	   in	  principal.	  
These	  creditors	  are	  not	  going	   to	  get	  paid	   in	   full.	  What	  Chapter	  9	   recognizes	   is	  
that,	  unlike	  in	  Chapter	  11,	  where	  you	  can	  decide	  just	  to	  liquidate	  the	  debtor	  enti-­‐
ty,	  have	  an	  auction,	  sell	  it	  off,	  and	  wipe-­‐out	  all	  the	  shareholders,	  you	  cannot	  do	  
that	  with	  a	  city	  or	  political	  subdivision	  of	  a	  state.	  San	  Juan	  has	  no	  shareholders.	  
There	  is	  no	  wiping-­‐out-­‐of-­‐the-­‐shareholders	  possible.	  PREPA,	  for	  example,	  exists	  
	  
	  47	   See	  P.R.	  CONST.	  art.	  VI,	  §	  8.	  
	  48	   See	  P.R.	  LAWS	  ANN.	  tit.	  13,	  §§	  11a-­‐16	  (2015).	  
	  49	   The	  term	  “clawback-­‐able”	  refers	  to	  the	  susceptibility	  of	  the	  pledged	  collateral	  to	  be	  redirected	  
to	  make	  interest	  or	  principal	  payments	  on	  general	  obligation	  bonds	  which	  the	  Puerto	  Rico	  Constitu-­‐
tion	  prioritizes	  over	  other	  disbursements.	  See	  P.R.	  CONST.	  art.	  IV,	  §	  8.	  
	  50	   U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  IV.,	  §	  3,	  cl.	  2.	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as	  a	  public	  entity	  that	  provides	  public	  services.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  viable	  to	  say	  that	  you	  
will	  liquidate	  it	  and	  not	  run	  power,	  or	  to	  say	  that	  you	  will	  fire	  the	  police	  force	  so	  
San	  Juan	  will	  not	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  police	  salaries.	  We	  will	  have	  “pitchfork	  costs,”	  
for	  economists,	   if	   that	  happens:	  we	  will	  have	   riots	   in	   the	   streets.	  The	   IMF	  gets	  
this,	  and	  the	  situation	  here	  is	  analogous.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  a	  minimum	  of	  sustaina-­‐
ble	   services	   that	  have	   to	  be	  provided.	  Of	   course,	  people	  wrangle	  over	   that.	   If	   I	  
have	  invested	  in	  a	  city’s	  bond	  portfolio,	  I	  would	  say:	  “What	  do	  you	  want	  all	  those	  
expensive	  police	  officers	  for?	  One	  or	  two	  are	  fine,	  make	  them	  work	  overtime.”	  If	  
you	  are	  a	  resident	  of	  the	  city,	  however,	  maybe	  you	  have	  a	  different	  perspective.	  
That	   is	   why	   we	   have	   a	   litigation	   system	   in	   bankruptcy	   court.	   The	   bankruptcy	  
judge	  does	  not	  tell	  you	  what	  to	  do,	  but	  he	  or	  she	  corrals	  people	  together	  to	  nego-­‐
tiate.	  And	  that	  is	  what	  happened	  in	  Detroit,	  the	  final	  topic	  to	  which	  we	  will	  now	  
turn.	  
IV . 	  LESSONS	  FROM	  DETROIT ’S 	  DEBT 	  RESTRUCTURING	  
Detroit’s	   Chapter	   9	   was	   successful,	   but	   I	   would	   not	   call	   it	   pretty.	   Like	   all	  
bankruptcies,	  it	  had	  some	  good	  things	  and	  bad	  things	  happen.	  Most	  important-­‐
ly,	   creditors	   took	   concessions.	   People	   who	   had	   pensions	   did	   not	   get	   their	   full	  
pensions.	   They	   took	  haircuts.	   People	  who	  had	   bonds	   as	   investments	   also	   took	  
haircuts	  as	  well.	  The	  bond	   investors	   took	  greater	  haircuts	   than	   the	  pensioners,	  
not	  because	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code,	  but	  because	  there	  was	  an	  external	  funding	  
source	  that	  came	  in	  and	  said,	  “We	  will	  provide	  some	  money	  to	  the	  city,	  but	  we	  
are	  not	  going	  to	  let	  it	  go	  to	  the	  bondholders	  when	  it	  can	  go	  to	  the	  pensioners.”	  In	  
addition,	  Detroit	  used	  some	  of	  the	  powers	  in	  bankruptcy	  to	  make	  politically	  un-­‐
popular	  decisions.	  Chiefly	   on	  my	  mind	   are	   labor	   rights.	  They	  have	   very	   strong	  
labor	   rights	   in	   Detroit,	   and	   those	   got	   altered	   in	   bankruptcy.	   I	   do	   not	   know	  
whether	   those	   would	   have	   been	   politically	   alterable	   outside	   bankruptcy.	   It	   is	  
easier	   to	   alter	  well	   entrenched	   labor	   rights	   in	   a	   bankruptcy	   system	   (blame	   the	  
“bad	  guy,”	  i.e.,	  the	  financial	  manager).	  
Finally,	  which	  I	  think	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  encouraging	  development	  of	  De-­‐
troit’s	   bankruptcy,	   is	   that	   Detroit	   cleaned	   up	   its	   financial	   mess	   and	   now	   has	  
meaningful	   access	   to	   the	  municipal	   leading	  markets.	  A	   lot	  of	   the	   terror	   stories	  
bond	  investors	  will	  tell	  you	  say:	  “If	  you	  file	  for	  Chapter	  9,	  you	  will	  never	  get	  cred-­‐
it	  again.	  The	  market	  will	  not	  trust	  you	  anymore.”	  That’s	  hogwash.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  
market	  can	  price	  anything	  it	  wants.	  The	  market	  prices	  Puerto	  Rico’s	  debt.	  I	  can	  
get	  a	  general	  obligation	  bond	   for	  around	  seventy	   to	  eighty	  cents	  on	   the	  dollar.	  
Heck,	  I	  can	  get	  the	  unsecured	  debt	  for	  thirty	  cents	  on	  the	  dollar,	  and	  that	  is	  junk	  
territory.	   Basically,	   the	   market	   will	   buy	   anything.	   So	   what	   did	   the	   market	   do	  
after	  Detroit	  emerged	  from	  bankruptcy?	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  market	  for	  new	  debt	  
was	   pretty	   pumped.	   The	   investors	   basically	   figured	   that	   with	   a	   clean	   balance	  
sheet	   for	   the	   borrower,	   they	   should	   buy	   bonds	   from	   the	   City,	   which	   now	   had	  
great	  ability	  to	  repay.	  It	  is	  the	  same	  reason	  why	  consumer	  debtors,	  when	  they	  rip	  
up	  their	  credit	  cards	  after	   they	  get	   through	  a	  Chapter	  7	  proceeding	  and	  have	  a	  
fresh	   start,	   find	   themselves	   subject	   to	   a	   deluge	   of	   direct	   offerings	   from	   credit-­‐
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card	  companies	  happy	  to	  lend	  to	  people	  who	  have	  discharged	  all	  their	  old	  debt.51	  
They	  have	  good	  cash-­‐flow	   to	  pay	  off	   this	  new	  credit-­‐card	  debt.	  Thus,	   I	  predict	  
that,	   if	   there	   is	  a	  restructuring	  of	  Puerto	  Rico’s	  debt,	   there	  will	  be	  credit	   in	  the	  
future	  that	  will	  be	  plentifully	  available.	  
Guess	  what	  happened	   in	  Detroit?	  Detroit	  had,	  quaintly	   for	   you	  guys,	  what	  
we	  thought	  was	  the	  worst	  bankruptcy	  problem	  ever	  in	  Chapter	  9.	  It	  had	  a	  twen-­‐
ty-­‐billion-­‐dollar	   debt	   problem,	   unheard	   of	   for	   the	   scope	   of	   Chapter	   9.	   But	   the	  
city	  ran	  through	  its	  Chapter	  9	  proceeding	  in	  about	  a	  little	  over	  a	  year.	  It	  was	  in-­‐
credibly	   well	   executed	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   there	   was	   a	   judge	   who	  was	   very	  
good	  at	  pushing	  things	  along.	  He	  figured	  that	  it	  is	  just	  bankruptcy,	  it	  is	  just	  zeros	  
and	  people	   fighting	   over	  money,	   so	   he	   decided	   to	   run	   things	   like	   a	  Chapter	   11	  
proceeding.	  The	  parties	  had	  to	  negotiate,	  to	  mediate,	  and	  cut	  a	  deal.	  That	  is	  what	  
happened.	  The	  Detroit	  plan	  was	  a	  consensual	  plan	  that	  creditor	  classes	  voted	  on	  
and	  passed.	  That	  requires	  pressure.	  You	  have	  to	  have	  pressure	  for	  people	  to	  set-­‐
tle.	  
Secondly,	  Detroit	  had	  a	  financial	  manager,	  who	  was	  basically	  a	  dictator	  who	  
got	  to	  make	  decisions	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  City.	  That	  is	  offensive	  to	  notions	  of	  popu-­‐
lar	  democracy.	  I	  understand	  it,	  but	  it	  does	  make	  negotiations	  happen	  a	  lot	  more	  
expeditiously.	   You	   do	   not	   have	   to	   schedule	   a	   city	   council	   meeting	   and	   get	   to	  
debate	  and	  talk	  about	  things.	  It	  is	  like	  having	  a	  CEO	  of	  a	  company	  to	  whom	  you	  
can	  ask:	   “Do	  we	  cut	   this	  deal	  or	  not?”	  You	  get	  an	  answer.	  But	   the	  dictatorship	  
cannot	  be	  permanent.	  We	  have	  had	  a	  successful	  regime	  change	  in	  Detroit.	  There	  
is	  no	  financial	  manager	  anymore.	  We	  have	  a	  very	  active	  mayor	  who	  liaised	  well	  
and	  had	  a	  smooth	  hand-­‐off	  from	  the	  financial	  manager.	  We	  still	  have	  a	  financial	  
oversight	   board	   in	  Detroit,	   and	   I	   know	   that	   that	   is	   not	   a	   popular	   thing,	   but	   I	  
think	  that	  it	  is	  going	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	  component	  for	  any	  resolution	  to	  this	  cri-­‐
sis.	  
CONCLUSION	  
So	   that	   is	  what	   bankruptcy	   can	  do.	  The	   last	   thing	   I	  want	   to	   say	   is	  what	   it	  
cannot	  do.	  What	  it	  cannot	  do	  is	  perform	  fundamental	  changes	  to	  the	  structure	  
of	  how	  you	  run	  the	  government	  in	  Puerto	  Rico	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  how	  you	  
focus	  your	  policies	  on	  economic	  growth.	  Did	  bankruptcy	  save	  the	  Big	  Three	  car	  
companies	   by	   shedding	   their	   excessive	   debt?	   Well,	   it	   certainly	   helped	   relieve	  
debt	  overhang,	   to	  be	   sure,	  but	  bankruptcy	  alone	  cannot	  make	  cars	   that	  people	  
want	   to	  buy.	  Bankruptcy	   cannot	  make	   jobs	   in	  Puerto	  Rico.	  That	   is	   a	  matter	  of	  
economic	  policy.	  That	   is	  why	  we	  have	  an	  elected	  government,	  and	  you	  have	  to	  
figure	  out	  what	  is	  the	  best	  for	  you	  guys.	  But	  what	  bankruptcy	  can	  do	  is	  get	  rid	  of	  
the	  debt	  overhang,	  so	  you	  do	  not	  squander	  thirty	  percent	  of	  your	  budget	  to	  pay-­‐
ing	  interest	  on	  unsustainable	  past	  debt,	  which	  is	  what	  you	  are	  doing	  right	  now.	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Bankruptcy	   gets	   rid	  of	   the	  old	  debt.	  But	   the	   future,	   the	  development,	  whether	  
this	   is	  going	   to	  be	  a	  place	  where	  people	  want	   to	   live,	  or	  whether	   it	   is	  going	   to	  
have	   jobs,	   is	  not	  up	   to	   the	  bankruptcy	  court.	  That	   is	  up	   to	   the	  elected	  officials	  
and	  the	  future.	  
As	   for	   Puerto	   Rico,	   there	   are	   two	   prongs	   to	  what	   is	   needed	   for	   bipartisan	  
debt	   relief.	   Number	   one	   is	   going	   to	   be	   a	   cancellation	   of	   debt	   or	   reduction	   of	  
principal:	  debt	  relief	  the	  “IMF/Chapter	  9”	  kind	  of	  way.	  Talk	  of	  avoiding	  the	  need	  
for	   restructuring	   is	   nonsense.	   It	   is	   going	   to	   happen,	   and	   Congress	   will	   get	   it	  
sooner	  or	  later.	  Number	  two	  is	  going	  to	  be	  external	  oversight.	  I	  understand	  that	  
the	  Governor	  wants	  to	  keep	  it	   internal,	  but	  my	  experience	  is	  that,	   for	  the	  same	  
reason	   that	   Detroit	   had	   to	   have	   an	   external	   oversight	   board,	   there	   is	   enough	  
water	  under	  the	  bridge	  of	  distrust	  with	  the	  financial	  management	  here,	  that	  the	  
creditor	  community	  now	  -­‐and	  the	  prospective	  future	  creditor	  community	  that’s	  
going	   to	  be	   lending	  here-­‐	   is	  going	   to	  want	   to	  have	  some	  cleaning	  of	   the	  house	  
and	  some	  external	  third-­‐party	  oversight.	  The	  Detroit	  board	  goes	  away	  after	  a	  few	  
years.	  After	  “x”	  years	  of	  surpluses,	  it	  winds	  itself	  out	  of	  existence.	  The	  same	  such	  
thing	  can	   readily	  be	   set	  up	  here.	  This	  means	   that	  an	  oversight	  board	  need	  not	  
entail	   some	   sort	   of	   permanent	   underclass	   situation	   to	   financial	   overlords.	   I	   do	  
think,	   however,	   it	   is	   a	   necessary	   political	   expedient	   and,	   by	   the	  way,	   probably	  
good	   from	  a	   fiscal	  policy	  perspective	  as	  well.	  External	  oversight	  and	  debt	   relief	  
capability	  are	  needed	  and	  will	  happen.	  I	  do	  not	  know	  how	  long	  it	  will	  take	  Con-­‐
gress	  to	  figure	  that	  out,	  but	  I	  hope	  it	  is	  soon.	  
Thus,	   in	   the	  end,	  bankruptcy	   law	  can	  do	  a	   lot	   for	  Puerto	  Rico:	   it	   can	   shed	  
unsustainable	  debt	  by	  corralling	  creditors	  into	  a	  consensual,	  super-­‐majoritarian	  
vote-­‐driven	  restructuring	  system	  that	  can	  bind	  dissident	  holdouts.	  It	  will	  not	  be	  
pretty,	  and	  it	  will	  require	  a	  lot	  of	  sacrifice	  from	  all	  constituents.	  But	  what	  it	  can-­‐
not	  do	  (at	  least	  directly)	  is	  create	  jobs,	  economic	  growth,	  or	  entrepreneurial	  cre-­‐
ativity.	  That	  is	  up	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Puerto	  Rico,	  and	  I	  have	  no	  doubt	  based	  on	  my	  
brief	  trip	  here	  that	  you	  will	  succeed.	  Thank	  you.	  
	  
